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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HELEN M. GRIMSHAW, Administratrix of the Estate of Ronald
Grimshaw, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No.

10750

vs.

R & R FL YING SERVICE, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant in her Amended Complaint sought
damages for the wrongful death of her husband caused
by the negligent operation of a commercial, air-carrier
flight by the defendant in which plaintiff's husband was
being transported for hire as a passenger.

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury and after the appellant
rested its case, on the third day of the trial, the respondent moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41 (b) U.R.C.P.
The trial court granted the motion of respondent and
dismissed the complaint and thereafter erroneously made
and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

RELIEJ<_, SOUGHT ON APPEAL
It was error for the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 4l(b) U.R.C.P., and since
the case was being tried to a jury it was error for the
trial court to make and enter Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. The Findings and Conclusions
should be stricken, the Order dismissing the complaint
should be vacated and reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant submits the following Statement of
Facts in accordance with the well accepted principle
that when a case is tried to a jury, the trial court must,
in considering a lVIotion to Dismiss, made pursuant to
Rule 41 (b) U.R.C.P., consider the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.
2

Prior to and on August 6, 1963, the respondent
operated a duly licensed, commercial air-carrier service
for hire. The respondent had a regular place of business
and held itself out to the public as available for hire.
It had an arrangement to fly for Utah Power & Light
Company at the call of the company and to bill the
company for the flight. ( T-34, 88, 89, 91. Exhs. 3, 4.)
On August 6, 1963, the respondent was hired by the
Utah Power & Light Company to fly one of its employees, (Ronald Grimshaw, the husband of the appellant) on a flight from Richfield, Utah, to Cottonwood
Canyon southwest of Marysvale, Utah, so that Mr.
Grimshaw could ascertain the cause of a power failure
in a power line running southwesterly through the
canyon from the Marysvale area to Beaver. (T-28, 29,
33, 34, 42, 44, 87, 97, 98, Exhs. 1, 5, 6, 7.)
Reed .Madsen, the president of respondent corporation, first received the flight request at 3 :30 p.m. at his
residence (T-97). Mr. Grimshaw was to meet the pilot
at the airport at 4 :00 p.m. ( T-98). The pilot , Ralph
Ross, was not present at the Madsen residence at 3 :30
p.m. when the call was received. It was about 15 minutes
before he returned to the Madsen residence and was
advised of the call. Thereafter the pilot had to drive to
the airport ( T-105) .
'Vhen the pilot (Mr. Ross) arrived at the airport
~Ir. Grimshaw was not yet present, but another aircraft
arrived. :Mr. Ross fueled the other aircraft and had a
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conversation about the weather with the pilot of the
other aircraft (T-46, 47, 48, 54). It would have
been at least 4 :00 p.m. before the respondent's aircraft
with Mr. Grimshaw aboard departed the Richfield
Airport (T-108).
The aircraft used on the ill-fated flight was a
Cessna l 72D ( T-111) . It was being flown by Ralph
Ross, an officer and an employee of the respondent corporation acting within the scope of his duty and authority ( T-87, 108, Exhs. 5, 6) . Ralph Ross was a commercially licensed and experienced pilot with 2,500 hours
of commercial flying time (T-92, 93). Mr. Grimshaw
was also a pilot but relatively inexperienced with only
277 hours of flying time ( T-246).
The aircraft was fairly new ( T-119) , had recently ·
had its 100-hour inspection and was in first class condition (T-120). There was no evidence or claim made
that there was any indication of any malfunction or failure of the aircraft, its engine or any of its other component parts or any of its instruments prior to impact
(T-21, 72, 159, R-26).
On the afternoon of the flight there were cumulus
clouds (thunderheads) in the area over the mountains
where the flight would go to make the power line inspec·
tion. Rain, downdrafts and turbulence could be expecterl
(T-50, 51, 52, 53). There was a 15-knot wind from the
southwest (a headwind, considering that the flight was
from Richfield to .Marysvale) and turbulence in the
4

area (T-167, Ex. 6). There were thunderstorms, rain
and winds throughout the general area including Milford, Cedar City, Delta and Bryce Canyon at the time
of the flight (T-75, 76, 77, 80, Ex. 2).
\Vinds from the southwest were to be expected with
resulting downdraft and turbulence on the eastern (leeward) side of the mountains where the crash occurred
(T-165, 166, 167, 167, 171, 172, 173). Downdrafts and
turbulence were to be anticipated, expected and guarded
against where the crash took place on the eastern (leeward) side of the mountains (T-175, 176). Mr. Grimshaw relied on the respondent to determine the weather
conditions and the advisability of flying into the area
under the existing conditions ( T-170) .
Because of the effects of altitude and temperature
on flight characteristics the efficiency of the aircraft at
the 9,000 foot elevation had been reduced by 77% (Tlll, 112, 140, Ex. 7). The rate of climb of the aircraft
had been reduced from 900 feet per minute to 200 feet
per minute, which is the service ceiling of the aircraft.
(T-146, 147, 148.)
Testimony was received that in flying a power line
inspection in the mountains the safe manner is to first
top the hill and fly down the line. If there is any weather
the line is not flown at all. ( T-103, 129).
It is not safe procedure to fly up the line because
it does not leave any way out (T-129). By flying down·
hill you are not faced with a situation where because of
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the steep rate of climb or the necessity of making a
sudden sharp bank you are risking a stall (T-131, 223).
Reed .l\ladsen, the president of the respondent corporation, and an adverse witness, testified that you never fly
up a canyon, even in good weather. He characterized
a flight "up" a canyon as "stupid" (T-131, 132, 133,
134).
The crash occurred on the east side of the mountains near the power line which runs generally west and
then southwest up Cottonwood Canyon from an area
south of :Marysvale over the mountains and down to
Beaver on the western side of the mountain ( T-30, 31,
32, 35, 36, Ex. l). The elevation at Richfield Airport
is 5,623 feet (Ex. 7). The elevation at the side of the
crash was 9,000 feet (R-24, T-70, Ex. 6). The mountain rises immediately to the west of the crash site to ,
an elevation of 12,173 feet at the top of Delano Peak
(Ex. 7, T-152). At the site of the crash Cottonwood
Canyon runs in a generally east-west-west direction
( T-37, 61) . The bottom of the canyon floor at the site
of the crash was only 50 yards wide ( T-66) . The plane
with its dead occupants was found in the bottom of the
canyon, twenty-five to thirty yards south of the creek
and the nose of the plane was headed south into the side ,
of the south canyon wall (T-36, 37, 38, 60, 155, 156,
158, 162, 229). The canyon wall to the south of the
crashed aircraft rose steeply above the aircraft ( 1'-39,
(W, 64). The ridges on the south, west and north sides
of the canyon rose 1,000 feet above the crash site (T1
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lfil) . The plane could not have topped any of the ridges
from the position it was in (T-161, 162).

The aircraft departed Richfield Airport at 1600
( 4 :00 p.m.) (Ex. 6). Flying time from the Richfield
A.irport direct to the crash site is 25 minutes ( T-103,
104, 184, 185). A damaged watch found in the wreck
had stopped at 4 :25 ( T-70, R-25). It would have taken
IO or 15 minutes more than the actual elapsed time to
fly to the top of the mountain and then back down the
line (T-185).
Reed Madsen, an experienced pilot and the president of respondent corporation explained in detail the
principles of flight. He testified that if an airplane maintains speed the airflow over the wings creates sufficient
lift to cause the plane to fly. If the speed is reduced,
the lift is reduced and the airplane stalls ( T-121). If
the airplane stalls control is lost (T-126). If control is
lost the aircraft has a tendency to wing over ( T-127) .
The aircraft was in a wing-over position at the time of
crash ( T-171) . If there is adequate elevation to regain
flying speed, control is restored and there is no problem
(T-124) . If you are flying downhill even a downdraft
will not cause a stall ( T-224). A steep bank increases
the possibility of a stall ( T-176). On a downhill flight
steep banks are not required ( T-235).
Reed Madsen filed a formal report of the accident
arnl testified concerning the cause of the crash. He said
that the crash was caused by a stall of the aircraft and
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the resulting loss of control ( T-179, 180, 200, Ex. 61
and that the stall was caused by downdraft and existing
turbulence (Ex. 6) which were to be expected (T-181).
The pilot didn't leave an adequate margin of safety
and didn't have sufficient altitude to recover from the
stall (T-180, 181, 182, 183, 184). He indicated that the
pilot lost control of the aircraft ( T-228) and that loss
of control is pilot error ( T-229).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTiNG RESPONDENT'S .MOTION TO DIS.MISS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE APLANT'S CASE BECAUSE THE APPELLANT
PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE.
It is a long established and well accepted principle
of law that the trial court in considering a Motion to
Dismiss made pursuant to Rule 41 (b) U.R.C.P. must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
appellant. The appellant is also entitled to have this
Honorable Court

"ReYiew all of the evidence, together with
every logical inference which may fairly be dr~w'.~
therefrom in the light most favorable to him.
(:Martin Y. Steyens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d
747).

8

The appellant in Count One of her Amended Complaint pleaded the specific negligence of the defendant
aud in Count Two pleaded a negligence case under the
theory of res ipsa loquitur to be inferred from the general circumstances surrounding the crash. This court
has previously recognized the right of a party to proceed
under both specific negligence as well as under the doctrine of res ipso loquitur. In the case of Loos v. Mountain F'uel Supply, 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254, under
headnotes 12 and 13 on page 259 this court said:
"In some cases where specific acts of negligence are alleged in the complaint the specific
allegations of violation of duty can be ignored
and the pleadings still show a cause of action
based on res ipsa liquitur .... Nevertheless we
think one who wishes to rely on that doctrine,
as well as specifically assigned acts of negligence,
must so plead, either by a separate count or by
proper allegation to the effect that the negligence to be inferred from the general situation
caused the injury, thereby notifying the other
party that he intends to rely on the Doctrine of
res ipsa liquitur."
There is substantial and compelling evidence of
the respondent's negligence in undertaking the flight in
the existing weather conditions. There is evidence of the
respondent's negligence in attempting to fly "across"
or "up" the canyon instead of following safe procedures
and flying "down" the canyon. There is substantial evidence that the fatal crash would not have occurred in
the absence of negligence and from those facts an infer-
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ence of negligence could be drawn by the jury under the
theory of res ipsa loquitur.

1

It is submitted that this appellant properly plead
and proceeded to try the case under both the theory
of specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur. It is also
submitted that the appellant established a prima facie
case under both theories and that the evidence viewed ill
the light most favorable to the appellant entitled her
to have the case submitted to the jury.

POINT II
THE RESPONDENT WAS A "CAR·
RIER FOR HIRE" AND OWED TO RONALD GRIMSHAW THE DUTY TO EXERCISE THE "UTMOST CARE" IN TRANSPORTING HIM SAFELY.
The respondent was licensed as a commercial flight
operator on January 18, 1963, under License No. 11,
issued by the Utah State Aeronautics Commission, pursuant to 2-1-35 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (1966
Pocket Part, page 83).
2-1-1 (31 and 32) Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
( 1966 Pocket Part, page 79) defines:

1

"Commercial flight operations shall be defin~d
as the carrying of persons or goods for hire
"
The respondent was also licensed as a commercial ,
carrier by the Federal Aviation Agency (T-91). Re- ·
10

spondent held itself out to the public at large as being
a carrier for hire (T-88, 89, Ex. 4), and was regularly
hired by the Utah Power & Light Company to transport
its employees (T-34).
In response to a call from the Utah Power & Light
Company the respondent undertook, for compensation,
to transport Ronald Grimshaw, an employee of Utah
Power & Light Company, on an observation flight
of a power company line. Under these circumstances,
the respondent was a "carrier for hire" and as such owed
Ronald Grimshaw, its passenger, the duty exercise
lhe utmost care in transporting him safely.
In Volume 8, Am. Jur. 2d, AVIATION, Sections
37 through 46, inclusive, Carriers in relation to aviation
are defined:
Section 38. "Generally, a 'common carrier'
may be defined as one who holds himself out to
the public as engaged in the business of transporting persons or property from place to place,
for compensation, offering his services to the
public generally; the distinctive characteristic
of a common carrier is. that he undertakes to
carry for all people indifferently, and the dominant and controlling factor in determining the
status of one as a common carrier in his public
profession or holding out, by words or by a
course of conduct, as to the service offered or
performed. A 'common carrier of passengers'
has been defined generaly, as one who undertakes
to carry for hire all persons who may apply for
passage, provided there is sufficient. space or
room available and no legal excuse exists for re-
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fusing .... Furthermore, scheduled operations
upon regular routes are not essential to a finding
that a carrier of passengers by air is a common
carrier, and 'air taxi senices' may be held or
found to be operated as common carriers. Sight.
seeing flights are also usually deemed to fall
~it?in .th~ classification where the carrier accepts I
md1scnmmately all who apply so long as there is
room and no legal excuse for refusing, and the
fact that the airplane does not carry passengers
from one point to another, but regularly returns .
without landing to the place from which it start· :
ed, has been held not to prevent the operation
from being that of a common carrier."
J

1

In the case of Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore,:
C.C.A. 8th Cir., 266 F. 2d 488 ( 1959), the Court said: .
"'Vheti1er an air carrier is a common carrier
is determined by the same principles as are ap· 1
plied in the cases of carriers by other means ....
A carrier is a common carrier if it holds itself ,
out to the public as willing to carry all passengers
for hire indiscriminately. The holding out may
be either by advertising or by actually engaging
in the business of carriage for hire."
1

1

In Christensen v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 35 Utah 137,
99 P. 676, (19oq) the Court stated:

1

"The law imposes the duty upon the carrier
of exercising the utmost care to protect his pa~·
sengers against accidents; and, in case an ac~1·
dent occurs, the inference arises that the carrier!
has not exercised that high degree of care which
the law imposes."
In McMaster v. Salt Lake Transportation Co.,i
108 Utah 207, 159 P.2d 121 (1945), the court stated:\
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"The duty imposed upon the defendant by
law was to use the utmost care to transport the
plaintiff safely."
In the case of Johnson v. Lewis, 121 Utah 218,
2-i<O P.2d 498 (1952), the court quoted with approval
language from an opinion by Judge Learned Hand and
again reaffirmed and restated the duty owed by a carrier
to its passenger:
"A carrier of passengers has indeed an important public function, and a lawful personal interest in his calling; so far as concerns those whom
he does not carry, these excuse injuries which
might be avoided, if he were extravagantly farsighted. But his very enterprise is to carry passengers safely, and he is bound to a much longer
forecast of the dangers which surround them than
he is as regards strangers. It is not perhaps important in just what terms this duty is measured;
usually they include the 'highest human foresight' possible in the circumstances. (Citing
cases.) It is, enough that the law exacts from him
a solicitude which would be unnecessary, and
indeed undesirable, in most enterprises. We are
not therefore to measure what the defendant
should have foreseen by ordinary standards, the
law imposes on him a meticulous regard for possibilities which should ordinarily be ignored. "

POINT III
THE FACTS VIEWED IN THE LIGHT
)JOST FAVORABLE TO THE APPELLANT
F.STARLISH THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
HESPONDENT IN THREE PARTICULAR
AHEAS:
13

(I) IN UNDERTAKING TO TRANSPORT
THE PAS SENGER INTO THE MOUNTAIN. I
ODS TERRAIN IN THE FACE OF THE 1
WIND, TURBULENCE AND WEATHER
FACTORS KNOWN BY THE RESPONDENT
OR WHICH, IN THE EXERCISE OF THE
CARE AND DUTY REQUIRED, SHOULD
HAVE BEEN KNOWN BY IT.
1

J

(2) IN FLYING THE AIRCRAFT ACROSS

THE CANYON IN VIOLATION OF SAFE .
FLIGHT PROCEDURES.
(3) IN FLYING THE AIRCRAFT UP THE
CANYON IN VIOLATION OF SAFE FLIGHT
PROCEDURE.
A disinterested witness, who is also a pilot and
therefore interested in weather conditions, testified that
she made an observation of the weather conditions from
the Richfield Airport immediately prior to the origina·
tion of the ill-fated flight and that she observed cumulus
clouds (thunderheads) in the immediate area and over
the mountains where the crash ultimately occurred and
within one hour thereafter (T-50, 51, 53, 56). Don
Elmer, a weather observer for the United States
Weather Bureau, testified and also identified Exhibit 2
which was offered and received in evidence. His testi·
mony and Exhibit 2 establishes winds, thunderstorms,
thunderheads and rain in the general area of the state
where the crash occurred, including Milford, Cedar
City, Delta and Bryce Canyon (T-75, 76, 77, 80, 81).
14
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The most persuasive testimony concerning wind
and weather conditions was elicited from Reed Madsen
'
the president of the respondent corporation and an
adverse witness. Exhibit 6, which is a report prepared
and filed by Madsen within ten days after the crash,
indicates a 15-knot wind from the southwest and existing turbulence (Ex. 6). Mr. Madsen's testimony also
established that downdrafts and turbulence could be
expected in the area (T-171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176,
178, 220, 221). His testimony further established that
Ronald Grimshaw relied on the respondent to determine
the weather conditions and the advisability of flying in
those conditions ( T-170, 171), and that there was no
aircraft malfunction and that the crash resulted from
loss of control by the pilot occasioned by a "stall" caused
by the pilot's error in flying into a steep, narrow canyon
and there being confronted with turbulence and downdraf ts which should have been expected (T-72, 172, 228,
229, 180, 200). Mr. Madsen also testified that if there
were adverse weather conditions the flight should not
have been undertaken (T-103).
From the foregoing facts the jury could have
reasonably found that the respondent failed to exercise
the required care, judgment, prudence and foresight in
undertaking the flight and that the fatal crash was proximately caused by that failure.
Mr. Allen L. Simkins, the Sheriff of Piute County,
testified that he visited the crash site early the morning
following the crash and spent all the next day at the
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site and that he made observations of the terrain. He
described the terrain as "rugged country, awfully steep
country." He said the "plane was, oh, I would say
twenty-five to thirty yards south of the creek, rigl;t
on the bottom of the canyon, and it was - the nose wa;
headed towards the south and it was upside down.'
( T-60, 64). He testified that the bottom of the canyo 11
was only 50 yards wide and that it went up equally steep
on either side of the canyon ( T-66). The south ca11yun
wall was characterized as "very steep." ( T-39). ~Ir.
_Madsen, the adverse witness, testified that it was "probably one thousand feet from the aircraft up to the top
of the ridges." (T-161).
All of the evidence indicated that at the site of the
crash the canyon runs in a generally east-west direction
( T-36, 37, 61) and that the aircraft crashed hea<le<l
south into the side of the south canyon wall ( T-36, 37,
38, 60, 155, 156, 158, 162, 229).

The adverse witness, Reed Madsen, testified that
it would require one-half mile to turn the plane aroun<l
( T-177) and that the plane couldn't have "topped" the
ridges from its position in the canyon ( T-161, 162). He .
further testified that the only safe procedure is to fly
down the canyon so that you will ha~e a way out (T-103. I
129, 131, 132, 133). He characterized any other pro- :
cedure as stupid (T-134).

1

1

!

The evidence was conclusive that at the time of
the crash the aircraft was in a steep banking turn to th' ,
1
right ( 'l'-71). which would he directing the flight of the
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aircraft from south (across the canyon) to west (up
the canyon).
From the foregoing facts a jury could reasonably
have found that the pilot was directing the aircraft either
across (south) or up (west) the canyon at the time of
the crash and that to do so was in violation of the respondent's duty to exercise the required degree of care for
the safety of Ronald Grimshaw.
The testimony of Reed Madsen, the adverse witness, clearly established that the only safe way to make
the flight under any circumstances is to fly down the
canyon (T-129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 223). The testimony
of Mrs. Peterson, when coupled with that of Reed Madsen, establishes that the aircraft could not have departed
the Richfield Airport prior to 4 :00 p.m. ( 1600) ( T-46,
47, 48, 54, 97, 98, 105). Furthermore, when Reed Madsen filed his official report within ten days after the
fatal crash he in di ca ted a 1600 ( 4 :00 p.m. ) departure
time from the Richfield Airport (Ex. 6) . He further
testified that flying time direct from the Richfield Airport to the crash site is 25 minutes (T-103, 104, 184,
195). A damaged watch found in the wreck had stopped
at 4 :25 (T-70, R-25). It was also Mr. Madsen's testimany that to first fly to the top of the mountain and
then fly back down the canyon would require IO or 15
minutes more (T-185).
Mr. Madsen also testified concerning the rate of
climb of the aircraft (T-111, 112, 140, 146, 147, 148,
Ex. 7). Based on his testimony the amount of time nee-

17

essary to leave Richfield and climb to the top of the
mountain can be mathematically computed to be 32
minutes: Mt. Delano elevation 12,173 feet minus Richfield elevation 5,623 feet equals 6,550 feet divided by
200 feet per minute (the established rate of climb\
equals 32 minutes. If the pilot had first "topped" the
mountain, it would have required several more minutes
to fly back down the canyon to the crash site.
From the foregoing facts a jury could reasonably
have concluded that the respondent, in violation of safe
flying procedures, attempted to fly up the canyon since
there was only sufficient time lapse, between takeoff at
4 :00 p.m. and crash at 4 :25, to fly direct to the site which
direct flight would of necessity be up the canyon. There
was not sufficient time elapse ( 32 minutes plus) to have
"topped" the mountain and then have flown back down
to the crash site. If the jury found that the Respondent
attempted to fly "up" the canyon it would be compelled
to find that the death of Ronald Grimshaw resulted from
the failure of the respondent to exercise the required
degree of care for his safety.

1

POINT IV
THE APPELLANT PLEAD RES IPSA
LOQUITUR IN COUNT TWO OF HER
AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND IS EN·
TITLED TO HAVE A JURY CONSIDER
THE EVIDENCE UNDER THAT THEORY.
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~

In Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d
592, at page 599, the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally stated and adopted the common law theory of
res ipsa loquitur when it stated at page 599:

"It is universally recognized that negligence
may be inferred from the happening of the accident and the surrounding facts and circumstances
where the facts are such as to reasonably justify
such inference even though there is no direct
testimony to establish the exact grounds of negligence which caused the accident."
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted
the theory that where the duty is that of the utmost care
owed by a carrier to its passenger that,
". . . in case an accident occurs, the inference
arises that the carrier has not exercised that high
degree of care which the law imposes." See Christensen v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 35 Utah 137, 99
P.676 (1909).
A general statement of the law of res ipsa loquitur
as it relates to aviation cases is set forth in 6 A.L.R. 2d
528 where it is stated as follows on page 529:

"It may be stated as a very general proposition
that, to the extent that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is recognized and applied in the particular jurisdiction in negligence actions generally, it is applicable in actions arising out of aviation accidents where the airplane or other instrumentality was under the exclusive control and
management of the defendant, and the a~cid~nt
was of a kind of character that does not ordmarily
happen if due care is used. The doctrine has
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been applied most frequently in actions for the
injury or death of passengers for hire. It has
been stated that it is peculiarly suitable in actions
against common carriers, due to the higher degree
of care required. The doctrine has also been
applied in actions for the injury or death of au
occupant other than a passenger for hire, and
for injuries to persons and property on the
groun d ... "
In the case of Stoll v. Curtiss Fying Service, annotated in 6 A.L.R. 2d 536, the court applies the alternative theory of res ipsa loquitur to aviation cases. The
rule is similar to that suggested in the Utah case of
Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply, supra. In Stoll v. Curtiss Flying Service the court instructed the jury as
follows:
"You must not invoke that doctrine if you find
that the accident happened as the plaintiff's witnesses claim it did, and that the claim indicates
to you negligence on the part of this pilot. The
presumption can only be invoked if you find that
the plaintiff did not prove what caused the accident. If you find that the cause the plaintiff
adduced or suggested was not the cause, the
plaintiff is in the position of not knowing the
cause, and he, therefore, may invoke the doctrine."
It is submitted that the evidence readily supports
an inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. The jury, from the evidence, could have reasonably found the following facts:
1. The aircraft was under the exclusive control of

the respondent.
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2. That the crash was of such a nature that it would

not have happened in the ordinary course unless the
respondent had failed to exercise the duty imposed by
law - the duty to exercise the utmost degree of care
in the transportation for hire of its passenger; the duty
not to fly into the canyon at all in face of the weather
and the to be expected turbulence and downdraft; nor
to fly up the canyon or across the canyon under any
circumstances.
Ronald Grimshaw was an amateur pilot and since
the aircraft had dual controls it has been the contention
of the respondent that the aircraft was under the control
of Ronald Grimshaw. There is absolutely no evidence
of control of the aircraft by Ronald Grimshaw. In the
absence of such evidence the law does not support the
contention of the respondent but presumes that the
control was in the respondent. In the case of Lange v.
Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc., 108 N.W. 428
(Minn. 1961), a licensed pilot was flying with a flight
instructor and both were killed in a crash of the airplane. The court held that the duty of care owed to the
plaintiff by the defendant was equivalent to that owed
by a carrier and that negligence can be inferred where
evidence tends to exclude all causes for a crash other
than human fa ult. The court further said that where
there is no evidence as to who was operating the controls, and the crash results from negligence, the pilot
in command is responsible and is considered to be negligent regardless of whether or not he is at the controls
at the time of the calamity.
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The respondent at the time of the crash was licensed
by the Federal Agency and the regulation of that
Agency is published in 14 C.F.R. 91.3 (1965):
"The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly
responsible for, and is the final authority as t~,
the operation of that aircraft."
The Utah State Aeronautics Commission has by
reference adopted the Federal Regulations. Subsection
1. (a) of Section III of the Rules and Regulations
adopted and promulgated by the Utah State Aeronautics Commission provides as follows:
"Pilots operating aircraft over the lands and
waters of the State of Utah shall comply with
all pertinent rules and regulations of the United
States Government, relating to air traffic, and
all rules and regulations promulgated by the
Utah State Aeronautics Commission."
Under the circumstances of this case where the
respondent is a carrier for hire and where there is no
evidence to the contrary, it may be said as a matter of
law that the aircraft was under the exclusive control of
the respondent.
There was no explanation of the crash inconsistent
with the respondent's negligence and there was no evidence of aircraft malfunction. To the contrary, all of the
evidence indicated that the aircraft was functioning
properly at the time of the crash (R-25). The only
explanation for the crash was the pilot's negligence
(see Ex. 6). 'Vi th reference to that Exhibit the adverse
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witness, Reed Madsen, the president of the respondent
corpora ti on testified ( T-179) :

Q. Is this the report that you filed?
A. Yes.
Q. In the report you described the flight to the
best of your knowledge?

A. To the best of my knowledge, yes, sir.
Q. And your description of the flight was: Pilot
left Richfield at 1600 to check power line
after trouble reported by Utah Power &
Light Company. Power Company Bent employee on flight.
From experience of pilot reporting it was
believed Mr. Ross had flown part of line. Due
to steep terrain he probably pulled off the
line and into a side canyon to lose altitude to
come back onto line at lower altitude. The
canyon has existing turbulence and downdraft. The plane was probably taken down
by severe downdraft and pilot made steep
right bank to avoid crashing side of canyon.
Aircraft stalled in bank and struck a tree?
A. This would be one explanation.

Q. It was your explanation, wasn't it, Mr. Madsen?
A. I don't think there is any such thing as an
explanation. It could have happened that
way. This is one way. Other things could
have happened, but this is just one of the
ways.

Q. This is merely your best opinion as to what
happened?
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A. This is correct.
( T-228) Q. It's nice to ignore all we do know
inclding your inspection or your investiga'.
tion and your experience by the facts that you
know and the opinoin you expressed as to
what happened, you just indicated and with
that indication that he lost control of the
aircraft; is that right?
A. This is my opinion as stated in that report.
I testified that I agreed as to this being one
good plausible explanation.

Q. And that would indicate the pilot lost control
of the aircraft?
A. He could have.

Q. And that loss of control of the aircraft in your
opinion would be pilot error, would it not!
A. It depends upon the circumstances. If there
was some unforeseen circumstances, no. If it
was circumstances that he erroneously got
himself into, yes.

I

Q. Directing your attention to your deposition,
Mr. Madsen, page 49, the question was asked /
you on line 3, if an airplane has its power, I
then went into a stall as a result of pilot error I
unless it is done intentionally and you an·
swered: "At a low altitude possibly, yes," I
and the question, "But certainly to stall it out .
in that canyon was an error, was it not?" And
your answ~r: "I suppose it would have to be.
They are both dead." Is that correct?

I

I

A. The answer on line 6 I said, "Possibly, yes.'' /
I
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It can no longer be said that flying is inherently
dangerous. This court in this modern age can take judicial notice of the advertised fact that "it is safer by far
to travel by air." Principles of flight are known, understood and practiced. Aircraft overcome the forces of
gravity and fly, and their occasional failure is not due to
some mysterious force or act of God. Their failure is
either mechanical or the failure of the pilot to exercise
that degree of care, judgment, prudence and foresight
which is consistent with the dangers involved.

From the occurrence of the crash and in the absence
of any explanation for the cause of the crash, the inference arises that the respondent carrier for hire failed
to exercise that high degree of care which the law imposes upon a carrier for hire. A jury could have so
found.
POINT V
THE DEFENSES OF ASSUMPTION OF
RISK AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
HY RONALD GRIMSHAW ARE 'VITHOUT
MERIT.
A. Assumption of Risk

The respondent in its answer to appellant's
Amended Complaint asserted the theory that Ronald
Grimshaw assumed the risk. The law is otherwise. In
the case of Foa; v. Trans World Airlines, 20 F.R.D. 565
(lTSDC, E.D. Pa. 1957) the court stated:
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"Finally, in view of the well settled rule that
a passenger on a common carrier does not assume
the risk of an injury to himself of his property
due to the negligence of the carrier, and u;r
modern view that the rules applicable to common
carriers of passengers apply with equal force to
aircraft, it follows that the defense of assumption
of risk is without merit and is stricken."
In Urban vs. Frontier Air Lines, 139 F. Supp. 288
(USDC, 'Vyoming, 1956) the court said:
" ... it can. no longer be said that a passenger
entering upon the modern commercial plane
voluntarily assumes a risk with respect to the
plane itself or its operation....
The rules applicable to common carriers of
passengers apply with equal force to aircraft ....
It follows that the defense of assumption of risk )/
is without merit."

In Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 38~ /
(USDC, E.D. New York, 1962) the court said:
1

I

"It is now well settled that merely by boarding
the plane commercial airline passengers no longer /
assent to encountering a known danger either
with respect to the plane itself or its operation."

I

B. Contributory Negligence

!

The respondent also raises the defense of contrib· I
utory negligence. It is difficult to see how a passenger I
being transported by a carrier for hire can contribute to I
the negligence of those charged with the duty to trans· I
port him safely.
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In the absence of any proof of the negligence ~f
tlie passenger the law would be as stated in Culver v.
Sckulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 344 P.2d 146 (1959), wherein
the court stated:
"\Ve agree with the defendant that there was
no proof of the passenger being careful, but
neither was there any proof of his being negligent,
and under such circumstances the legal presumption is that he was alert to the preservation of
his own life and well being."
This court has adopted a principle of law establishing a presumption of due care in cases of retrograde
amnesia. In the case of Ewan v. Butters, 16 Utah 2d
272, 399 P.2d 210 (Utah 1965) the court stated:
"'Vhere the loss of memory rendering the survivor of an accident incapable of testifying as
to the accident is shown to be attributable to such
accident, it will be presumed, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that he exercised due
care."
It is submitted that the same principle should apply
where the party is not merely suffering from retrograde
amnesia, but is dead. If that principle is applied the
presumption is that in the absence of evidence to th~
contrary, the deceased passenger, Ronald Grimshaw,
was exercising due care for his own safety.
It is of no avail to the respondent to suggest that
the flight was inherently hazardous - for the duty of
the carrier for hire is commensurate with the risk. If the
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Hight was hazardous, then the respondent was under u
duty imposed by law to apprehend the risks and dangn,
involved and to consequently exercise a greater degree
of human foresight, caution and prudence.
Subsection 4. (a) of Section III of the Rules and
Regulations of the Utah State Aeronautics Commission adopted and promulgated pursuant to 2-1-12 Utali
Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
"No person shall operate an aircraft within
the State of Utah in a reckless or careless manner or in such a way as to endanger the lives or
property of persons on the ground or in the air."
If it is the contention of the respondent that the
Hight was inherently dangerous, then it is an admission
that the flight was being operated in violation of the
foregoing regulation - which would in and of itself
be negligence.

CONCLUSION

I

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO UN· ,
DERSTAND THE FACTS AND CONSIDER I
THEl\1 IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN i
FACTS OF AVIATION AND THE PREV AILING LAW.
The trial court demonstrated its lack of under·
standing of the facts when it stated in the presence of I
the jury (T-226):
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"I don't think there is a man living who knows,
of course, save and except the two occupants of
that plane.... If we knew what that flying was,
then I think you would have a right to ask
whether or not that would be safe flying."
and on page T-227:
"May I say that my point is that no one knows
the circumst:,inces."
and on page T-228:
"I repeat again, if he knew what the pilot was
doing at that particular time, what prompted
him to go where he went, then I think you would
have a right to say to him as an expert now, would
flying under these conditions be the prudent
thing to do or would it not be, but this jury must
conclude this and it is their province to determine
whether or not there was negligence in this particular instance, based upon the facts and circumstances. I C¥1't believe that we've got enough
factual matters here, because no one knows, no
one knows, consequently I am going to deny or
sustain the objection."
There has been transmitted to this court as part
of the record on appeal an affidavit of the Court Reporter who reported the trial proceedings. It is to be
noted from the affidavit that the reporter lost his notes
of the arguments of counsel and the remarks of the court
made during the argument. We assume that other
counsel will remember the remark of the trial judge and
will not object to our recital of the same even though
it is not in the record. At the conclusion of the arguments
nn the defendant's motion to dismiss and as a prelude
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or an explanation - an apology, even for his decision
'
the trial court stated:
"I have never been in an airplane and I am
never going to."
The trial court apparently overlooked all of the
facts and adopted the "old-fashioned" attitude that flying is inherently dangerous and there is and can be no
explanation for the crash of an aircraft - except that
it is a mysterious happening - an Act of God.
It is submitted that in the early days of flight prior to \Vorld 'Var II - the courts of this land would
have agreed with the trial court. But, it is also submitted
that in this modern, technical age it is known that air·
craft fail because of understood mechanical failures or
because of the pilot's error in operating the aircraft
in certain unacceptable manners or in weather and
terrain known or reasonably expected to be hazardous
to the operation of an aircraft.

\Vhile the law may not keep constant pace with
the progress of technology, it is suggested that the
modern cases dealing with aviation problems have rec·
ognized that there is nothing mysterious about flight
and that when the facts are known the reason for a flight
failure is readily understood.
It is submitted that in this case sufficient facts arc
known to explain and permit an understanding of tht
failure. That knowledge and that understanding permit
and demand the application of long standing and 'rell
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accepted legal principles to the end that the appellant in this action may have her full day in court including the right to have a jury consider the known facts
under modern and appropriate instructions as to the law.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN T. VERNIEU and
JAMES P. COWLEY
of Pugsley, Hayes, Rampton & Watkiss
Attorneys for Appellant
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